The Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict:  Rejection of a Debtor\u27s Collective Bargaining Agreement by Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 80 Issue 1 
1981 
The Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict: Rejection of a Debtor's Collective 
Bargaining Agreement 
Michigan Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Legislation 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michigan Law Review, The Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict: Rejection of a Debtor's Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, 80 MICH. L. REV. 134 (1981). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol80/iss1/4 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
NOTES 
The Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict: Rejection of a Debtor's Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code1 (Code) permits debtors to 
avoid liquidation by reorganizing their failing businesses.2 Under a 
bankruptcy court's supervision, the trustee or debtor in possession3 
may institute a plan4 that reduces or extends a business's debts to 
ensure its continued operation.5 To facilitate business revival, the 
provisions of chapter 11 allow debtors in possession substantial flex-
ibility to restructure enterprises as they see .fit.6 One of those provi-
sions, section 365(a),7 permits the debtor in possession, with the 
court's approval, to reject the business's burdensome executory 
contracts. 8 
I. II U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (S1 pp. III 1979). Title I of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (Supp. III 1979), applies to cases filed on and after October l, 1979. It 
repealed the Bankruptcy Act, ch. S41, 30 Stat. S44 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-
1200 (1976) (repealed 1978)). For a su=ary of the Reform Act's history, see Kennedy, Fore-
word· A Brief History of the Bankruptcy Refo~ Act, S8 N. C. L. REV. 667 (1980). 
2. See H.R. REP. No. S9S, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted in (1978) U.S. CooE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS S963, 6179. "The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that 
are used for production in the industry for which they were designed are more valuable than 
those same assets sold for scrap." Id 
3. Section 36S(a) refers only to the trustee's right to seek court-approved rejection, but if a 
trustee is not appointed by the court to administer the estate and the debtor remains in posses-
sion, then it "shall have all the rights ... of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter." 1 I 
U.S.C. § 1107(a) (Supp. III 1979). 
Section 36S(a) also applies to chapter 7 liquidations, I I U.S.C. § 103(a) (Supp. III 1979), 
but since the vast majority of reported cases on rejection of union contracts involve a reorgani-
zation rather than a liquidation, this Note will refer exclusively to reorganizations. The Note 
also usually refers to the use of the power of rejection by the debtor in possession rather than 
the trustee because most reorganizations under the Code involve a debtor in possession. 
4. See II U.S.C. §§ 1121-1129 (Supp. III 1979). 
S. See H.R. REP. No. S9S, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220-21 (1977), reprinted in (1978] U.S. 
CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 5963, 6179-80. 
6. See Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., S23 F.2d 164, 168-
69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975), and 423 U.S. 1073 (1976) ("This section (then 
§ 313, currently§ 365) enables the court to implement the policy of Chapter XI, which is to 
permit the debtor-in-possession to deal with the debtor's property in a way that will enable it 
to survive, by relieving it of executory contracts that would threaten or prevent its survival."); 
Silverstein, Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy and Reorganization, 31 U. Cm. L. 
REv. 467, 472 (1964). 
7. II U.S.C. § 365(a) (Supp. III 1979). 
8. Section 36S(a) provides: 
Except as provided in sections 76S and 766 of this title and in subsections (b), (c), and 
(d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any 
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor. 
II U.S.C. § 36S(a) (Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added). 
The legislative history states: ''Though there is no precise definition of what contracts are 
134 
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In at least one instance, the flexibility inherent in the Code's re-
jection provision appears to clash with another federal statutory 
scheme. Although it is generally agreed that collective bargaining 
agreements are viewed as executory contracts by the bankruptcy 
law,9 these agreements are accorded special treatment under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act10 (NLRA). Congress enacted the NLRA 
to protect employees' right of self-organization and to encourage 
peaceful resolution of labor disputes. I I "Central to achievement of 
this purpose is the promotion of collecJive bargaining as a method of 
defusing and channeling conflict between labor and management."I2 
executory, it generally includes contracts on which performance remains due to some extent on 
both sides." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 347 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CooE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 5963, 6303. One commentator proposed what has become the widely 
accepted definition: "a contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other 
party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance 
would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other." Countryman, Ex-
ecutory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 
Countryman (pt. I)]. 
The Code, like its predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act, does not provide any guidance for the 
courts to decide when to approve the request for rejection. Two bankruptcy courts have had 
the opportunity to decide whether the pre-Code standard for rejection of union contracts will 
apply under the new law and both courts adopted the preexisting approach. In re David A. 
Rosow, Inc., 9 Bankr. Rptr. 190 (Bankr., D. Conn. 1981); In re Allied Technology, Inc.,• 8 
Bankr. Rptr. 366 (Bankr., S.D. Ohio 1980); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY~ 365.03, at 365-17 to 
-18 (15th ed. 1981). Pre-Code cases will, therefore, be used to support current assertions. 
Courts use a variety of standards, often depending on the type of contract involved. The 
Supreme Court, in deciding whether to permit rejection of a lease during a railroad reorgani-
zation, found that the trustee needed "broad discretion" to implement the plan of reorganiza-
tion. Therefore, said the Court, "the question whether a lease should be rejected . . . is one of 
business judgment." Group oflnst. Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 
550 (1943) (citation omitted). For a summary of the different standards of rejection used by 
courts, see H. MILLER & M. COOK, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT 
145-51 (1979). 
Section 365 substantially altered several areas of the law regarding executory contracts in 
bankruptcy. For a summary of these changes, see Fogel, Executory Contracts and Unexpired 
Leases in the Bankruptcy Code, 64 MINN. L. REV. 341 (1980); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 
~ 365 (15th ed. 1981). For the leading articles on executory contracts before the Code, see 
Countryman (pt. I), supra; Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part II, 58 MINN. 
L. REV. 479 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Countryman (pt. II)], and Silverstein, supra note 6. 
9. See Shopmen's Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698, 704 (2d Cir. 1975). 
10. 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-169 (1976). 
11. "It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate ... obstructions to the 
free flow of commerce . . . by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining 
and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association [and) self-organization 
.•.. " National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act§ I, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 449-50 (1935), 29 
U.S.C. § 151 (1976). The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "[e]nforcement of the obli-
gation to bargain collectively is crucial to the statutory scheme." NLRB v. American Natl. Ins. 
Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1952). First Natl. Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 101 S. Ct. 2573 (1981); 
Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 499 (1979) ("[Collective bargaining] is preferable to 
allowing recurring disputes to fester outside the negotiation process until strikes or other forms 
of economic warfare occur."); H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970); Fibreboard 
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 744 (1962); NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1937). 
12. First Natl. Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 101 S. Ct. 2573, 2578 (1981). The Court supported 
its statement with a quotation from its first NLRA decision: 
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For this reason, sections 8(a)(5)13 and 8(d)14 of the Act require both 
labor and management to negotiate labor contracts in good faith, 15 
and. make an employer's unilateral termination of a collective bar-
gaining agreement an unfair labor practice. 16 
When a business wishes to reject a collective bargaining agree-
ment in the course of chapter 11 proceedings, the policies of the 
Bankruptcy Code and the Labor Act seem to conflict. Because rejec-
tion is a unilateral act of the debtor in possession, it appears to vio-
late the NLRA.17 Strict adherence to the termination provisions of 
the NLRA, 18 however, may defeat the Code's policy of releasing 
debtors from burdensome contracts to facilitate recovery. Courts 
that have addressed the question allow debtors in possession to reject 
collective bargaining agreements, but scrutinize proposed rejections 
of such agreements more closely than rejections of other types of 
"Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of the right of employees 
to self-organization and to have representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of 
collective bargaining is often an essential condition of industrial peace. Refusal to confer 
and negotiate has been one of the most prolific causes of strife. This is such an outstand-
ing fact in the history oflabor disturbances that it is a proper subject of judicial notice and 
requires no citation of instances." NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S., at 42 
(upholding the constitutionality of the Act). 
IOI S. Ct. at 2578 n.11. 
13. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). 
14. 29. U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). 
15. Section 8(a)(5) states that "(i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to 
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) 
(1976). Collective bargaining is defined in § 8(d) as ''the performance of the mutual obliga-
tion of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). 
Section 8(d) contains a proviso that elaborates on the basic definition of collective 
bargaining: 
(T]he duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party lo such contract sha11 termi• 
nate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification -
(I) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract ... ; 
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party . . .; 
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service . . .; 
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the 
terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is 
given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later: 
... /1]he duties so imposed sha11 not be construed as requiring either party to discuss or 
agree to any modffecation of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed 
period, !f such modffecation is to become e_ffective before such terms and conditions can be 
reopened under the provisions of the contract. 
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976) (emphasis added). 
16. See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 495 (1979); Allied Chem. & Alkali Work-
ers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971); NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 
U.S. 421 (1967); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). 
17. This Note does not address the question of whether the Labor Board may hold that a 
debtor in possession violates § 8(a)(5) either by refusing to bargain with t~e union over its 
decision to reject the collective bargaining agreement, or by the act of rejection. See note 87 
in.fra. · 
18. See note 15 supra. 
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contracts.19 
This Note examines the courts' accommodation of the labor and 
bankruptcy policies when a debtor in possession or trustee seeks to 
reject a collective bargaining agreement. Part I criticizes a series of 
recent cases that failed to confront the statutory conflict. If these 
courts had recognized the conflict between the language of the Bank-
ruptcy Act (now the Code) and the Labor Act, they would have been 
forced to consider whether the labor and bankruptcy policies actu-
ally clashed. Part II finds that in most instances they do not, and 
argues that requiring the debtor in possession to bargain with the 
union before approving rejection of a collective bargaining agree-
ment will better satisfy the policies that underlie both statutes. 
l. THE CURRENT APPROACH TO UNION CONTRACTS IN 
REORGANIZATION PROCEEDINGS 
A. Kevin Steel and Its Progeny 
A number of recent cases have sidestepped the conflict between 
the labor and bankruptcy laws by treating the debtor and the debtor 
in possession as two separate entities, and holding that the Labor Act 
obligations of the former have no bearing on the bankruptcy law 
rights of the latter.20 InShopmen's Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, 
19. See Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 169 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975), and 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); Shopmen's Local 455 v. 
Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975); note 78 infra. . 
Although it has been suggested that "courts have generally implemented the bankruptcy 
provisions in a manner that gives effect to the underlying purposes of the labor laws to the 
greatest extent possible,'' Note, The Bankruptcy Law's Effect on Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 391, 395 (1981) (footnote omitted), this Note suggests a solution 
more fully consistent with the labor laws that is also compatible with the policies underlying 
the Code's reorganization provisions. 
20. Local Joint Exec. Bd. v. Hotel Circle, Inc., 613 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980); Truck Drivers 
Local807 v. Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d312 (2d Cir. 1976),ajfdpercuriamaflerremand, 567 F.2d 
237 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978); Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks 
v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975), and 423 U.S. 
1073 (1976); Shopmen's Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975). 
Kevin Steel and REA Express have been the subject of considerable law review commen-
tary, some of it skeptical of the new approach, but failing to identify the problems with the 
court's rationale that form the basis for this Note. See La Penna, Bankruptcy and the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement, PROCEEDINGS 29TH NYU CONF. LAB. 169 (1976); Levy & Blum, Limi-
tations on Rejection of Union Contracts Under the Bankrupicy Act, 83 COM. L.J. 259 (1978); 
Miller, Bankruptcy, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 709 (1976); Otterbeck, Bankruptcy Law, 1976 ANN. 
SURVEY AM. L. 569; Note, Labor-Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Chapter XI 
Proceedings, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 192 (1976); 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 743 (1976); 81 
DICK. L. REV. 64 (1976); 45 U. CIN. L. REv. 281 (1976); 28 VAND. L. REV. 1374 (1975). Two 
Notes made brief references to potential problems with the new entity theory. Note, Bank-
ruptcy and the Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 51 NOTRE DAME LA w. 819, 829-
30 (1976); 22 WAYNE L. REv. 165, 173 (1975): "Yet it is difficult to see how a debtor-in-
possession can be truly distinct from its former self. Where there have been no changes in 
management, except to introduce overall bankruptcy court supervision, any analogy to succes-
sor employer situations seems tenuous." 
A recent Note makes a cursory disposal of any criticism of the new entity theory by citing 
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Inc. ,21 the leading case,22 the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) asserted that rejection of a collective bargaining agreement 
would directly violate sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the NLRA.23 
"Congress," the Board argued, "nowhere indicated that the . . . 
Bankruptcy Act would constitute any limitations on [section 8(d)]."24 
The Board inferred from section 2(1) of the NLRA,25 which provides 
one of the Supreme Court's successorship cases. See Note, supra note 19, at 397-98 n.58 (citing 
Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 262-63 n.9 (1974)). The 
relevant language of the Court's opinion ~ Howard Johnson is as follows: 
[T]he real question in each of these "successorship" cases is, on the particular facts, what 
are the legal obligations of the new employer to the employees of the former owner or 
their representative? The answer to this inquiry requires analysis of the interests of the 
new employer and the employees and of the policies of the labor laws in light of the facts 
of each case and the particular legal obligation which is at issue, whether it be the duty to 
recognize and bargain with the union, the duty to remedy unfair labor practices, the duty 
to arbitrate, etc. There is, and can be, no single definition of "successor'' which is applica-
ble in every legal context. A new employer, in other words, may be a successor for some 
purposes and not for others. 
417 U.S. at 262-63 n.9. 
This Note argues, contrary to the Kevin Steel-REA Express analysis, that a reorganization does 
not present a set of facts and circumstances analogous to those in Burns Security, the case the 
Second Circuit relied upon to terminate the debtor's labor obligations under the existing con-
tract. 
See also Countryman (pt. II), supra note 8, at 492-98; Hughes, "Wavering Between the 
Profit and the Loss": Operating a Business J)uring Reorganization under Chapter 11 of the New 
Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. LJ. 45, 49-51, 84-86 (1980); Note, Corporate Reorganiza-
tions and the Rights of Labor, 53 HARV. L. REv. 1360 (1940); Note, Labor Law - Banknptcy, 
68 MICH. L. REv. 739 (1970); Comment, Collective Bargaining and Bankruptcy, 42 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 477 (1969); Comment, The Priority of a Severance Pay Claim in Bankruptcy, 21 UCLA L. 
~v. 722, 742-46 (1980); Note, Executory Labor Contracts and Municipal Bankruptcy, 85 YALB 
LJ. 957 (1976). 
21. 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975). ''This case squarely presents to an appellate court, appar-
ently for the first time, the question whether section 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act allows rejec-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement as an executory contract." 519 F.2d at 700. 
22. Prior to Kevin Steel, several district courts had addressed the questions whether and 
under what conditions bankruptcy courts could allow rejection of union contracts. These 
courts treated collective bargaining agreements like any other executory contract, and permit-
ted rejection upon the d~btor's showing that continued enforcement of the contract was detri-
mental to the debtor's estate. In re Business Supplies Corp. of America, 72 Lab. Cas. ~ 13,940 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (bankruptcy court terminated executory collective bargaining agreement in 
Chapter XI reorganization); Carpenters Local 2746 v. Tumey Wood Prods., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 
143 (W.D. Ark. 1968) (collective bargaining agreement rejected in straight bankruptcy pro-
ceeding); In re Klaber Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (bankruptcy court has 
power to permit rejection of collective bargaining agreement in Chapter XI proceeding). In In 
re Public Ledger, Inc., 161 F.2d 762, 767 (3d Cir. 1947), the court denied the trustee's claim 
that the contract could be rejected only because the trustee had long conformed to its terms. 
But see In re Overseas Natl. Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359, 360 (E.D.N.Y. 1965) (Railway 
Labor Act contracts "can be changed or cancelled only in conformity with that Act."). The 
district court counselled that when a court has the power of rejection, it be exercised "only 
after thorough scrutiny, and a careful balancing of the equities" for and against disaffirmance. 
238 F. Supp. at 361-62. Kevin Steel adopted the approach suggested by this case. See text at 
notes 79-80 infra. 
23. Brief for Intervenor-Appellee at 13-15, Shopmen's Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., 
Inc., 519 F.2d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee]. See notes 13-16 
supra and accompanying text. 
24. Brief for Appellee, supra note 23, at 14. 
25. 29 u.s.c. § 152(1) (1976). 
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that a trustee in bankruptcy is a "person" subject to the Act's provi-
sions, that Congress specifically intended to regulate debtors in 
bankruptcy proceedings.26 The Board concluded, therefore, that 
"authorizing the rejection of collective bargaining agreements in ar-
rangement proceedings permits a company to accomplish indirectly 
what it could not accomplish directly without violating the NLRA -
namely, to unilaterally terminate a contract during its term."27 
The Second Circuit rejected the Board's argument, choosing in-
stead to resolve the issue by denying the existence of a statutory con-
flict. The court first noted that the Board's argument "fails to take 
into account the nature of a bankruptcy proceeding. A debtor in 
possession . . . is not the same entity as the pre-bankruptcy com-
pany."28 According to the court, the commencement of chapter XI 
(now 11) proceedings creates a "new entity'' with its own rights and 
duties.29 Under this approach, a debtor in possession is not a party 
under section 8( d) to any labor agreement with the union and thus is 
not bound by the section's termination restrictions until it ratifies the 
existing agreement or enters into a new contract. 30 The court saw 
26. Brief for Appellee, supra note 23, at 15 n.14. 
27. Id at 14. 
The Board, in Kevin Steel, made the argument that the power to reject executory contracts 
does not include union contracts. See 519 F.2d at 703; Brief for Appellee, supra note 23, at 16. 
"'(A] collective bargaining agreement [is not an ordinary contract.]' [Rather,) 'it is a genera-
lized code to govern ... the whole employment relationship. It calls into being a new com-
mon law - the common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant.'" 519 F.2d at 
703 n.9 (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964)). The court 
of appeals answered that "section 77(n) of the Bankruptcy Act shows that Congress knew how 
to remove labor agreements from the scope of a general power to reject executory contracts," 
and, therefore, by implication, intended to permit other types of labor agreements to be re-
jected. 519 F.2d at 704 (citation omitted). 
28. 519 F.2d at 704 (emphasis in original). 
29. 519 F.2d at 704. 
The leading bankruptcy treatise supports the court's view of the debtor in possession as a 
different entity from the debtor. See 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY f 6.30-.32 (14th ed. 1978); J. 
MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 313, at 377 (1956); Cramer v. Mammoth Mart, Inc. (In re 
Mammoth Mart, Inc.), 536 F.2d 950, 954 (1st Cir. 1976) ("[T)he debtor-in-possession is a sepa-
rate legal entity that is carrying on the business principally for the benefit of the pre-filing 
creditors."). 
This Note does not challenge the bankruptcy law's view of the debtor in possession as a 
new entity. Instead it argues that, regardless of the different legal status of the debtor in pos-
session, its interest in the company is indistinguishable from the debtor's for the purpose of 
fulfilling the debtor's Labor Act obligations, and that the Labor Act intended to bind the 
trustee or debtor in possession to the debtor's obligations. 
In Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975), and 423 U.S. 1073 (1976), the court cited In re Capital Serv., 
Inc., 136 F. Supp. 430 (S.D. Cal. 1955), as additional support for the proposition that the 
debtor in possession is not bound to the collective bargaining agreement entered into by the 
debtor. 523 F.2d at 170. Capital Service involved an oral common-law employment contract 
that had no specified term and was terminated, the court held, when the chapter XI petition 
was filed. The case had nothing to do with the duties imposed upon a debtor in possession by 
the NLRA or the effect of bankruptcy on collective bargaining agreements. 136 F. Supp. at 
434-35. 
30. 519 F.2d at 704. 
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the debtor in possession as analogous to a successor employer: If the 
debtor in possession could not seek rejection of union contracts, "the 
new entity would be in a worse position than a successor employer, 
who is generally not bound by the existing labor agreement."31 
After determining that it could permit the debtor in possession to 
reject the union contract without sanctioning a violation of the 
NLRA, the Kevin Steel court considered what standards should gov-
ern the rejection of such contracts.32 It found unacceptable the non-
labor contract standard that looked only to the effect on the debtor's 
financial status because that test ignored the important policies be-
hind the Labor Act.33 Courts must, therefore, not only carefully 
scrutinize applications to reject collective bargaining agreements, but 
also must balance the policies favoring rejection with the conflicting 
labor policies.34 
One month after Kevin Steel, the Second Circuit extended its 
"new entity'' analysis to the debtor in possession's duty to adhere to 
the substantive provisions oflabor contracts. In Brotherhood of Rail-
way, Airline & Steamship Clerks v. REA Express, Inc. ,35 the debtor in 
possession imposed substantial changes in union wages and benefits 
before the court authorized rejection of the collective bargaining 
agreement.36 Although Kevin Steel did not alter the debtor in pos-
session's obligation to meet the terms of the contract between the 
date that a chapter petition is filed and the date of court-approved 
rejection,37 the court relied upon Kevin Steel to hold that the debtor 
in possession "acted as a new juridical entity."38 According to the 
court, this new entity ''was not a party to and was not bound by the 
terms of the collective bargaining agreement entered into by REA as 
31. 519 F.2d at 704 ("It may be that the obligations of such a trustee or debtor are analo-
gous to those of a successor employer . • • ,"). 
32. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 365.03, at 365-13 to -18 (15th ed. 1981). 
33. 519 F.2d at 707. 
34. See notes 78-83 infra and accompanying text. 
35. 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975), and 423 U.S. 1073 (1976). 
The conflict in REA Express concerned a collective bargaining agreement governed by the 
Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976). The court found the relevant RLA 
provisions to be substantially similar to the NLRA provisions discussed in Kevin Steel, and 
therefore applied the same ''new entity'' analysis. 523 F.2d at 169. 
Note that section 1167 of the Code in effect overrules REA Express by exempting all collec-
tive bargaining agreements covered by the RLA, whereas the Bankruptcy Act exempted only 
contracts covering railroad employees. 11 U.S.C. § 1167 (Supp. Ill 1979) (replaced 11 U.S.C. 
§ 205(n) (1976)). The REA Express analysis is still useful because its rationale applies to all 
types of collective bargaining agreements. 
36. 523 F.2d at 171-72. 
37. The Kevin Steel court did not permit the debtor in possession to alter the terms of the 
union contract before court-approved rejection. See text at notes 28-30 supra. Employers 
must comply with executory contracts until the court authorizes rejection. See notes 40 & 43 
infra. 
38. 523 F.2d at 170. 
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debtor, unless and until the contract should be assumed, either ex-
pressly or [by] conforming to its terms without disaffirmance."39 
The Second Circuit has subsequently retreated from REA Ex-
press's expansive reading of Kevin Steel's new entity theory, and has 
reaffirmed the narrower view that the theory only applies to termina-
tion restrictions.40 In Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Bohack Corp. ,41 the 
court observed that "the status of the debtor-employer is, in some 
respects, analogous to that of a successor employer so far as an ex-
isting collective bargaining agreement is concemed."42 But filing a 
chapter 11 petition "does not mean that the agreement ceases to ex-
ist. It means that for the narrow purpose of resolving otherwise con-
flicting provisions of the labor and bankruptcy laws," the debtor in 
possession is not a party to the agreement, and thus is not subject to 
the termination restrictions of section 8(d) of the :N'LRA.43 Even 
39. 523 F.2d at 170 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The court seized upon the anal-
ogy made in Kevin Steel of a debtor in possession to a successor employer, see note 31 supra, 
and argued that the principles that freed a successor employer from the terms of its predeces-
sor's agreement are "particularly applicable" in bankruptcy. 523 F.2d at 170. According to 
the court, a successor "must be granted certain prerogatives at the outset [of the chapter pro-
ceeding] in making changes in the method of operation, business structure and labor arrange-
ments of a venture. Otherwise, the free flow of capital and efforts to revive or expand a weak 
enterprise might be frustrated." 523 F.2d at 170. The court held, therefore, that the debtor in 
possession was "not bound to follow the elaborate and protracted procedures of § 6 of the 
RLA before putting into effect its proposed terms of employment." 523 F.2d at 171. 
40. Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Boback Corp., 541 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976), affd per curiam 
qfter remand, 561 F.2d 237 (2d. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978). See generally 
Rodman v. Rinier (In re W.T. Grant Co.), 620 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980); Zelin v. Unishops, Inc. (In re Unishops, Inc.), 553 F.2d 305, 308 
(2d Cir. 1977); Texas Importing Co. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 360 F.2d 582, 584 (5th 
Cir. 1966); Smith v. Hill, 317 F.2d 539,542 n.6 (9th Cir. 1963); Consolidated Gas Elec. Light & 
Power Co. v. United Rys. & Elec. Co., 85 F.2d 799, 805 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 663 
(1936) ("An executory contract, therefore, remains in force in a proceeding under 77B until it 
is rejected . . . ."). 
41. 541 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976), affd percuriam•qfter remand, 561 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978). 
42. 541 F.2d at 320 (emphasis added). 
43. 541 F.2d at 320. "Of course, the statement that the debtor is not a 'party,' ... cannot 
be taken literally, since neither affirmance nor rejection of the collective bargaining agreement 
would be possible by one not a party to it." 541 F.2d at 320. 
Bo/tack clarifies and reasserts the obligation of the debtor in possession to comply with the 
existing agreement entered into by the debtor until the bankruptcy court approves the request 
to permit rejection. Unilateral modification of the terms of a labor contract before court-
approved rejection is specifically prohibited. The filing of a chapter petition has no effect on 
the debtor in possession's substantive obligations under a labor agreement until court-approved 
rejection. In re Connecticut Celery Co., 23 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 68, 74-76 (Bankr., D. Conn. 
1980). 
Whether a debtor in possession can unilaterally alter the contract before court-approved 
rejection affects the priority of labor's damage claims for breach of contract. Under the 
Bo/tack rationale, the debtor in possession is not permitted to make unilateral changes in a 
collective bargaining agreement before court-approved rejection. If the employer does modify 
the contract without consulting the union, this will give rise to a first priority administrative 
expense claim. Zelin v. Unishops, Inc. (In re Unishops, Inc.), 553 F.2d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 1977); 
Cramer v. Mammoth Mart, Inc. (In re Mammoth Mart, Inc.), 536 F.2d 950, 954 (1st Cir. 1976); 
American Anthracite & Bituminous Coal Corp. v. Leonardo Arrivabene, S.A., 280 F.2d 119, 
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with its scope so limited, however, the new entity theory causes 
courts to slight unnecessarily the policies underlying the Labor Act. 
B. The New Entity Theory and the Successor Employer Analogy 
Underlying Kevin Steefs holding that debtors in possession who 
seek to reject union contracts do not violate the NLRA was the 
court's new entity theory.44 The Second Circuit cited no authority 
for this theory,45 and nothing in the legislative history of the Bank-
ruptcy Code or of the Act that it superceded suggests that Congress 
authorized trustees or debtors in possession to reject the debtor's ex-
ecutory contracts because it deemed them separate entities not 
bound by those contracts. Indeed, what little evidence exists tends to 
undermine the theory.46 Undaunted by this lack of congressional 
support, the court analogized the obligations of a trustee or debtor in 
possession to those of successor employers, who are generally not 
bound by collective bargaining agreements.47 REA Express ex-
panded on this analogy, finding successorship principles "particu-
larly applicable" in bankruptcy.48 Although the court correctly 
summarized the law of successorship, 49 its analogy is unhelpful in 
the reorganization context50 and obscures the need to balance the 
124 (2d Cir. 1960). But see In re Miracle Mart, Inc., 396 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1968) (" '[B)reach' 
in fact of an executory contract by the debtor during the period of administration does not 
necessarily make the damages that flow therefrom costs of administration."). 
Section 507 establishes the order of priority of claims and expenses against the debtor. 11 
U.S.C. § 507 (Supp. III 1979). 
44. See text at notes 28-31 supra. 
45. See 519 F.2d at 704. 
46. The legislative history of section 36S(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 36S(g) 
(Supp. III 1979), for example, indicates that ''rejection of an executory contract ••• constitutes 
a breach of the contract .... " S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 60, reprinted in [1978) 
U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 5787, 5846. It seems implausible that a Congress that consid-
ered debtors in possession and trustees new entities not bound by preexisting contracts would 
also treat rejection as a breach of contract. The better interpretation is that Congress author-
ized rejection under § 365 to provide the flexibility necessary to reorganize failing businesses 
despite its recognition that the debtor in possession was a party to the contract and was techni-
cally bound by its terms. 
47. 519 F.2d at 704. 
48. 523 F.2d at 170. 
49. See NLRB v. Burns Intl. Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 281-91 (1972); Note, Con-
tract Rights and the Successor Employer: The Impact efBurns Security, 71 MICH. L. R.Ev. 571 
(1973). 
SO. Not the least of the problems with the analogy is that bankruptcy courts may lack 
jurisdiction to pass on a debtor in possession's successorship status. In a related context, the 
Ninth Circuit recently held: 
We think the court erred in issuing a stay solely on the basis of its determination that the 
Receiver was not an alter ego of the business's former operators. Whether a new em-
ployer is an "alter ego" or a "successor'' to an earlier employer is a question of substantive 
federal labor law, the resolution of which is committed to the Board and the courts that 
review its determinations . . . . The bankruptcy court erred in issuing a stay on the basis 
of an unresolved issue of federal labor law. 
NLRB v. Jonas (In re Bel Air Chateau Hosp., Inc.), 611 F.2d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir. 1979) (per 
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policies underlying the conflicting statutes. 
The leading case on the successorship doctrine is NLRB v. Bums 
International Security Services, Inc. ,51 a case cited by Kevin Steel.52 
The defendant in Bums replaced another company that had been 
providing security services to an airport, and hired a majority of its 
predecessor's employees. The Supreme Court held that the NLRB 
may require a successor to recognize and bargain with a union that 
had established a bargaining relationship with its predecessor, but 
cannot require it to accept the terms of the predecessor's collective 
bargaining agreement because the successor was not a party to that 
contract. According to the Court, the interests in encouraging the 
sale and transfer of businesses and in promoting agreements that re-
flect the parties' relative economic strength outweighed the benefits 
of retaining the predecessor's contract.53 Potential buyers may be 
unwilling to take over businesses. unless they can effect substantial 
curiam). See also In re Shippers Interstate Serv., Inc., 618 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1980); Seeburg 
Corp. v. NLRB (In re Seeburg Corp.), 5 Bankr. Rptr. 364 (Bankr., N.D. Ill. 1980). The new 
Bankruptcy Code's expanded jurisdictional provision, however, may eliminate this objection. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. Ill 1979). The constitutionality of this broad grant of jurisdiction 
is currently being challenged. Marathon Pipeline Co. v. Northern Pipeline Co., 12 Bankr. 
Rptr. 946 (D. Minn. 1981), appeal granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3365 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1981) (No. 81-
150). See generally Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Court Under the New Bankruptcy Law: Its 
Structure, Jurisdiction, Venue, and Procedure, 11 ST. MARv's L.J. 251 (1979); Note, Article III 
Limits on Article I Courts: The Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Court and the 1979 Magis-
trate Act, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 560 (1980). 
In Bel Air, a debtor committed certain unfair labor practices. By the time that the Labor 
Board could enforce its remedy, the debtor had filed a Chapter XI petition and a receiver had 
been appointed to run the company. The receiver argued that as a "different entity" than the 
debtor, it was not subject to the Board remedy. The receiver then applied for a stay by the 
bankruptcy court of further Board proceedings. The bankruptcy court granted the stay and 
the district court affirmed, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and vacated the stay. The lower 
court reasoned that the receiver was " 'a new and distinct juridical entity' " against which the 
debtor's prior unfair labor practices could not be remedied. 611 F.2d at 1251. The court of 
appeals held that a question of successorship, new entity, or alter ego status could not be 
decided by a bankruptcy court, but only by the Labor Board, because it involved a determina-
tion of substantive federal labor law. 611 F.2d at 1251. See also Petrusch v. Teamsters Local 
317 (In re Petrusch), 108 L.R.R.M. 2608 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (expanded jurisdictional provision 
of Code does not authorize bankruptcy court to enjoin picketing authorized under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act). 
51. 406 U.S. 272 (1972). The Supreme Court dealt with successorship questions in two 
other cases, Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974), and 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). 
For general discussions of successorship principles, see Goldberg, The Labor Law Obliga-
tions of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U. L. REv. 735 (1969); Morris & Gaus, Successorship 
and the Collective Bargaining Agreement: Accommodating Wiley and Burns, 59 VA. L. REv. 
1359 (1973); Slicker, A Reconsideration of the .Doctrine of Employer Successorship -A Step 
Toward a Rationa~Approach, 51 MINN. L. REv. 1051 (1973); Note, The Bargaining Obligations 
of a Successor Employer, 88 HARv. L. REv. 759 (1975); Note, The Impact of Howard Johnson 
on the Labor Obligations of the Successor Employer, 14 Mice. L. REv. 555 (1976); Note, supra 
note 49; Co=ent, Contractual Successorship: The Impact of Burns, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 617 
(1973). 
52. Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 704. 
53. Burns Security, 406 U.S. at 287-88. 
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changes in corporate structure, the labor force, and working condi-
tions. 54 Because collective bargaining agreements may limit a new 
management's ability to work such changes, they may inhibit the 
free movement of capital.55 And since the transfer may have im-
proved the firm's economic position, permitting "the balance of bar-
gaining advantage to be set by [the new] economic power realities"56 
preserves industrial peace - a primary Labor Act goal. 
Proponents of the new entity theory have argued that allowing 
rejection of labor agreements in reorganization proceedings pro-
motes the same interests that the Bums Court found compelling. 
Unless debtors in possession may promptly and unilaterally reject 
burdensome employment terms, ~hey argue, efforts to encourage the 
free flow of capital and to revive or expand weak enterprises might 
fail.57 Courts must determine, therefore, whether the interests impli-
cated by chapter 11 petitions are sufficiently similar to those impli-
cated by the sale of a business to justify relaxing the debtor in 
possession's Labor Act obligations. 
Relying on the Bums Court's first interest, one might argue that 
rejection of labor agreements facilitates transfers of assets, but this 
analogy to the sale of a business is inappropriate. When a chapter 11 
petition is filed, the debtor transfers control of its assets to the bank-
ruptcy court and continues to run the business and administer the 
assets for the benefit of its creditors. 58 The Bums successor rule tells 
debtors facing bankruptcy or debtors in possession that if they sell 
the business, buyers will not be bound by the terms of an existing 
labor contract. In a simple reorganization, therefore, it is not neces-
sary to extend successorship principles further by releasing the 
debtor in possession from the debtor's section 8(d) obligation,59 and 
the benefits to debtors that the bankruptcy laws provide ensure that 
they already have sufficient incentives to commence reorganization 
proceedings. 60 But the Bums Court was not interested in facilitating 
54. 406 U.S. at 287-88. 
55. 406 U.S. at 288. 
56. 406 U.S. at 288. 
57. REA Express, 523 F.2d at 170. 
58. Cramer v. Mammoth Mart, Inc. (In re Mammoth Mart, Inc.), 536 F.2d 950, 954 (1st 
Cir. 1976) ("[T]he debtor in possession is a separate legal entity that is carrying on the business 
principally for the benefit of the pre-filing creditors."); 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY~ 6.30(4] at 
923 (14th ed. 1978) (''The property is in the hands of the court, although the debtor is left in 
possession, and the 'control of the court is then pervasive.' "). This characterization of the 
debtor's interest is incomplete, however, because once the plan of reorganization is confirmed, 
the property of the estate vests in the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 114l(b) (Supp. III. 1979). No debtor 
has ever maintained that labor obligations entered into as debtor in possession fail to bind the 
post-bankruptcy debtor, but such a position flows from the new entity theory. This Note as-
serts that the type of "transfer'' effected by the filing of a bankruptcy petition was not intended 
to upset the statutory scheme of the Labor Act. 
59. See text at notes 51-56 mpra. 
60. The decision whether or not to enter reorganization will be unaffected by the debtor's 
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transfers for their own sake; rather, it saw transfers as desirable be-
cause they might aid business revival. To the extent that rejection is 
necessary for a reorganization to succeed and thereby preserve jobs, 
it is justified despite the contrary command of the labor laws. This 
economic justification for rejection, however, does not support a con-
clusion that bankruptcy and labor law do not clash. 
The Burns Court's concern-for avoiding the industrial unrest that 
often attends agreements not reflecting the parties' relative economic 
strength also does not justify lifting the debtor in possession's Labor 
Act obligations. When a business is sold, the successor employer is 
frequently financially stronger than its predecessor, and the union 
will seek to renegotiate its contract to guarantee wages and benefits 
commensurate with the new management's economic position. New 
contracts following the sale of a business may thus benefit the union 
and promote industrial peace. In reorganization proceedings, how-
ever, it is the rejection of the debtor's collective bargaining agree-
ment that may cause labor unrest.61 Because the employer's 
economic position is declining, the employees will receive far less if 
their contract is rejected. Although the Second Circuit recognized in 
Kevin Steel that only a "foolhardy . . . employer would provoke a 
strike by trying to terminate an existing labor contract,"62 it then 
proceeded to interpret the law as allowing that result. 
Not only does the Burns Court's successorship doctrine fail to 
support Kevin Steers new entity theory, but cases that addressed the 
question of the prebankruptcy Labor Act duties of a debtor in pos-
session also undercut that theory. In NLRB v. Baldwin Locomotive 
Works,63 for example, the NLRB attempted to enforce a remedy 
against a debtor for unfair labor practices committed by the debtor 
in possession during a bankruptcy reorganization. The debtor ar-
gued that it was "not chargeable with unfair labor practices which 
occurred while its property and business were being managed and 
ability to reject a labor contract, because "[t]he adverse consequences of bankruptcy are ordi-
narily far too harsh .... " Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 706. 
61. In Kevin Steel, the Board argued that "permitting rejection at the expense of the em-
ployees impairs industrial peace, since the only means employees have to protect the losses 
they will suffer in such a situation is to strike." 519 F.2d at 703. The court answered the 
Board's concern by noting that "the specter of industrial unrest fades when the number of 
cases in which this issue appears is examined." 519 F.2d at 706. However, the court could 
have concluded that the paucity of litigation is due .to employers' fear of industrial unrest if 
they exercise their power of rejection. See text accompanying note 62 i,ifra. One commentator 
suggested that "[t]his paucity may be misleading since many disputes between labor and em-
ployers both in and out of reorganization proceedings do not find their way into the reports.". 
Note, Corporate Reorganizations and the Rights of Labor, supra note 20, at 1360 n.2. In recent 
years, the number of reported cases has increased significantly. See note 78 i,ifra. A recent 
article discusses union response to the increase in chapter 11 filings. See Bus. WEEK, Dec. 8, 
1980, at 87. 
62. 519 F.2d at 703. 
63. 128 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1942). 
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operated by it as the debtor in possession . "64 Disregarding 
whether the two were technically different entities, the court looked 
to the substance of the relationship between the prebankruptcy 
debtor and the debtor in possession and found their mterests indis-
tinguishable for the purpose of interpreting their responsibilities to 
the company's employees. The court's language is instructive: 
Court supervision of corporate reorganization affords the operating 
possessor no freedom from its statutory duty to its employees. And, 
where managerial control and economic interest of the debtor in pos-
session and the reorganized company are the same . . . 
. . . [then i]n no legally significant sense ... can the [debtor] be 
differentiated from the debtor in possession so far as the employer-
employee relationship is concerned. 65 
Although the facts of Baldwin and Kevin Steel differ greatly, the 
courts in both cases were forced to consider the employers' Labor 
Act duties and Bankruptcy Act rights. Baldwin relied upon the ab-
sence of change in management and the debtor's continued eco-
nomic interest in the profitability and vitality of the corporate . 
enterprise to conclude that the debtor and debtor in possession are 
the same for Labor Act purposes. Kevin Steel found that the transfer 
of control to the court that occurs when a chapter proceeding is com-
menced and the formal change in the legal status of the debtor alter 
a deotor's section 8(d) obligations to its employees. Baldwin's ap-
proach is preferable because it rests the decision on the substance of 
the continuing employer-employee relationship, and thus more fully 
protects the policies of the NLRA. 66 
The new entity theory has been rejected in other contexts as well. 
fuNLRB v. Coal Creek Coal Co. ,67 a debtor committed unfair labor 
practices but had entered federal receivership and was being liqui-
dated before the NLRB's order could be enforced. Citing Southport 
Petroleum Co. v. NLRB,68 the Tenth Circuit held that "responsibility 
[for unfair labor practices] cannot be avoided by reorganizations, 
transfers or any other 'disguised continuance.' "69 The NLRB has 
64. 128 F.2d at 42. 
65. 128 F.2d at 43-44 (footnote omitted). 
66. Kevin Steel cited Baldwin for the proposition that debtors in possession must comply 
with the Labor Act. 519 F.2d at 704. Kevin Steel held, however, that the debtor in possession's 
duty to comply with NLRA § 8(d) does not arise until it makes its own agreement or assumes 
the debtor's contract. The issue arises whether a logical distinction can be maintained between 
the court's willingness, on the one hand, to enforce unfair labor practice remedies on a debtor 
in possession for the debtor's acts and imposing the § 8(d) obligation of the debtor on the 
debtor in possession. This Note argues that the Labor Act intended to make no such distinc-
tion. Baldwin held not merely that the debtor in possession must comply with the NLRA, but 
that the debtor be held accountable for the debtor.in possession's unfair labor practices be-
cause the two entities are_ indistinguishable for Labor Act purposes. 
67. 204 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1953). 
68. 315 U.S. 100 (1942). 
69. NLRB v. Coal Creek Coal Co., 204 F.2d at 580. 
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frequently concluded that the debtor in possession is an alter ego, 
rather than a successor, of the debtor.70 And at least one court has 
relied upon the NLRA's definitional provision71 to hold a bank-
ruptcy trustee to the Labor Act obligations of the prebankruptcy em-
ployer. In In re American Buslines,72 the court refused to stay73 
representation proceedings before the NLRB that were commenced 
prior to the filing of the reorganization petition. Citing the defini-
tional section of the NLRA, the court concluded that the "interven-
tion of bankruptcy, or corporate reorganization of an employer is not 
allowed to deprive . . . employees of the rights defined and assured 
to them by the [Labor] Act . . . ."74 
Cases like Baldwin, Coal Creek, and American Buslines are dis-
tinguishable from Kevin Steel, but nevertheless undercut the Second 
Circuit's new entity theory. First, the Labor Act violations in those 
cases did not consist of acts explicitly authorized by the bankruptcy 
laws. More importantly, bankruptcy policies are implicated to a 
lesser extent in Baldwin, Coal Creek, and American Buslines than in 
cases like Kevin Steel. Only in the latter situation is it necessary to 
eliminate an ongoing obligation of the debtor to facilitate reorgani-
70. See Oxford Structure, Ltd., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 151 (1979); Airport Limousine Serv., 
Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 932, 934 n.2 (1977); Jersey Juniors, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 329, 331-32 (1977). 
See also U.S. Lingerie Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 750, 763 (1968) ("[l]nstitution of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings does not extinguish preexisting bargaining obligations ... whatever obligation (the 
debtor] had to bargain with the union before the chapter XI proceeding was filed, the debtor in 
possession assumed when it operated [the debtor's] business."). But see Blazer Indus., Inc., 236 
N.L.R.B. 103, 109 (1978) (receiver opened a significantly different business after long hiatus 
from operations). 
A recent bankruptcy case rejected the "NLRB's contention that the debtor in possession 
should be treated as the 'alter ego'" of the debtor. In re Unit Parts Co., 10 Bankr. Rptr. 970, 
979 (Bankr., W.D. Okla. 1981). This Note also rejects the Board's position, but asserts that a 
direct conflict does, in fact, exist between the relevant labor and bankruptcy statutes. "Succes-
sor'' or "alter ego" labels are simply not useful and distract the courts from resolving the basic 
conflict. 
71. NLRA § 2(1), 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1976). The version in effect in 1957 included within 
the definition of employer "trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers." NLRA, ch. 120, 
§101, 61 Stat. 136, 137 (1947). The current version includes ''trustees, trustees in cases under 
title 11, or receivers." 
72. 151 F. Supp. 877 (D. Neb. 1957). 
73. The automatic stay is one of the fundamental protections provided by the bank-
ruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection 
efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a 
repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressure that 
drove him into bankruptcy. 
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in (1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 5963, 6296-97. See generally Kennedy,Automatic Stays Under the New Bankruptcy 
Law, 12 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 3 (1978); Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. 
MICH. J. L. REF. 175 (1978). 
74. 151 F. Supp. at 886. 
The Board's brief in Kevin Steel raised the same argument by citing NLRA § 2(1) as evi-
dence of the Labor Act's intent to bind the debtor in possession to the debtors' obligations, but 
the Second Circuit opinion never directly answered the argument. Brief for Appellee, supra 
note 23, at 15 n.14, 20. 
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zation of its business. These factors, however, affect only the weight 
that courts should give to the bankruptcy policies; they do not point 
to the absence of a clash between labor and bankruptcy law. 
Perhaps the strongest argument against the Second Circuit's new 
entity theory is one court's recognition that the theory "does not eas-
ily translate into other areas of bankruptcy law."75 In a pair of cases, 
the Second Circuit has been forced to limit its use of the theory to 
the specific facts of Kevin Steel and REA Express.16 The courts 
would reach sounder results if they recognized the conflict between 
the Code and the NLRA and resolved cases by balancing the rele-
vant policies. 
II. RESOLVING THE CLASH BETWEEN LABOR AND BANKRUPTCY 
POLICIES 
When a debtor in possession exercises its Bankruptcy Code right 
to reject a collective bargaining agreement, it runs afoul of the 
NLRA. The logic of the new entity theory, which holds that rejec-
tion does not violate the Labor Act because the debtor in possession 
is not a party to the contract, is unpersuasive. This does not mean, 
however, that rejection is always inappropriate. It means instead 
that courts should recognize the conflict between the bankruptcy and 
labor laws, and exercise their discretion to approve or disapprove 
rejection requests in a way that will strike a sound balance between 
the competing policies.77 In most cases, courts can strike this bal-
ance by requiring the parties to bargain concerning possible private 
modifications of the agreement before considering a debtor's request 
for rejection. 
To some extent, the courts already engage in a balancing process. 
Most courts examine petitions for rejection of collective bargaining 
agreements more closely than petitions to reject other types of con-
tracts.78 Even Kevin Steel recognized the special nature of labor con-
15. In re Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 6 Bankr. Rptr. 968, 976 n.8 (E.D. Mich. 1980). 
76. See In re Unishops, 543 F.2d 1017, 1018-19 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Truck Drivers 
Local 807 v. Boback Corp., 541 F.2d 312, 319-20 (2d Cir. 1976), '!ffd percuriam efter remand, 
567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978). 
77. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 216 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (courts 
should "seek out that acco=odation of the two [statutes] which will give the fullest possible 
effect to the central purposes of both"). 
78. REA Express, 523 F.2d at 169; Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 707; In re Figure Flattery, Inc., 
88 Lab. Cas. ~ 11,850, at 23,501 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Alan Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp. 165, 
169 (E.D. Pa. 1978), appeal dismissed, 595 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Studio Eight Light-
ing, 91 L.R.R.M. 2429, 2430 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); In re Unit Parts Co., 10 Bankr. Rptr. 970 
(Bankr., W.D. Okla. 1981); In re David A. Rosow, Inc., 9 Bankr. Rptr. 190 (Bankr., D. Conn. 
1981); In re Allied Technology, Inc., 8 Bankr. Rptr. 366 (Bankr., S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Con-
necticut Celery Co., 23 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 68, 74 (Bankr., D. Conn. 1980); In re Ryan Co., 
83 Lab. Cas. ~ 10,487, at 17,951 (Bankr., D. Conn. 1978); In re City Transfer Co., 19 COLLIER 
BANKR. CAs. 357, 360 (Bankr., D. Hawaii 1978). See also Barman's Inc. v. Allied Supermar-
kets, Inc. (In re Allied Supermarkets, Inc.), 6 Bankr. Rptr. 968 (E.D. Mich. 1980). But see 
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tracts and the unique concerns that a court considering a petition for 
rejection of such contracts must face. Termination of labor con-
tracts, the court observed, deprives employees of" 'seniority, welfare 
and pension rights, as well as other vafuable benefits which are inca-
pable of forming the basis of a provable claim for money dam-
ages.' "79 Moreover, rejection leaves " 'the employees without 
compensation for their losses,' " and permits the debtor, " 'at the ex-
pense of the employees, to consummate . . . a more favorable plan 
of arrangement with its other creditors.' "8° For these reasons, the 
court remanded the case to the district court for its "careful scru-
tiny.''81 Subsequently, in REA Express, the court held that rejection 
is appropriate "only where it clearly appears to be the lesser of two 
evils and that, unless the agreement is rejected the [business] will 
collapse and the employees will no longer have their jobs."82 
This concern for balancing the competing policies has led many 
courts to adopt a two-step test for rejection - asking first whether 
failing to reject will cause the business to collapse, and then balanc-
ing the equities between the parties to the agreement. 83 Although 
this two-step test requires courts to accord some weight to the rights 
of a debtor's employees, it places no Labor Act responsibilities on 
the debtor in possession. Under current law, a chapter 11 petition 
can be filed by or against the debtor, the debtor in possession can 
apply for court-approved rejection, and, after rejection, can reset the 
worker's employment terms without incurring a legal obligation to 
bargain with the union. The two-step test ignores the Labor Act 
mechanism designed to resolve labor-management disputes over 
Local Joint Exec. Board v. Hotel Circle, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 778, 789 (S.D. Cal. 1976) ("The 
court should exercise this power where rejection of the executory contract is to the advantage 
of the estate."), ajfd., 613 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980). For an unexplained reason, the Ninth 
Circuit stated: "We ... do not need to address the question whether a bankruptcy court 
should apply a stricter standard for authorizing the rejection of collective bargaining agree-
ments as a means of reconciling the policies of the labor and bankruptcy laws." 613 F.2d at 
213-14 n.2. For a discussion of the case, see 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 311. For a summary of the 
different standards of rejection used by courts, see H. MILLER & M. Coor<, supra note 8, at 
145-51. 
Courts considering rejection of nonlabor contracts often base their decisions "solely on 
whether [rejection] will improve the financial status of the debtor." Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 
101. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY~ 365.03 at 365-13 to -18 (15th ed. 1981). 
79. 519 F.2d at 707 (quoting In re Overseas Natl. Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359, 361-62 
(E.D.N.Y. 1965)). 
80. 519 F.2d at 707 (quoting In re Overseas Natl. Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. at 362). 
81. 519 F.2d at 7Q7. 
82. 523 F.2d at 172. 
83. One court has detailed this two-step analysis: 
First, the court should determine that.the agreement is onerous and burdensome to the 
estate, so that failure to reject will make a successful arrangement impossible. Second, the 
equities must be balanced and found to favor the debtor. Then, and only then, may rejec-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement be permitted. 
In re Alan Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp. 165, 169 (E.D. Pa. 1978), appeal dismissed, 595 F.2d 
1211 (3d Cir. 1979). 
150 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 80:134 
wages and benefits - bargaining between the parties - and it thus 
violates both the spirit and the letter of the NLRA. 
- A bargaining requirement enables courts to preserve the NLRA,s 
collective bargaining system to the fullest extent possible. If the par-
ties negotiate to an impasse and are unable to reach a mutually satis-
factory compromise, the bankruptcy court could then permit 
rejection if necessary to ensure the success of the reorganization.84 
Because the Bankruptcy Code gives courts discretion over proposed 
rejections of executory contracts,85 no new legislative authority is re-
quired to implement the proposed requirement, and, indeed, it is 
consistent with the current two-step test. In light of the test's busi-
ness collapse prong, courts should, except in emergency situations, 
presume that a business will not collapse unless the parties have bar-
gained to impasse. Collective bargaining agreements are not indeli-
ble, and the union can provide financial concessions to ensure that 
the union contract does not cause the company's collapse. Only if 
bargaining fails can bankruptcy courts confidently assert that no al-
ternative lies between rejection of the contract and the companis 
collapse. A court could reach the same ~esult by balancing the equi-
ties, as required by the current test's second prong, if it recognized 
the inequity of sacrificing strong labor policies before the parties 
have reached an impasse. 
Bankruptcy courts may be concerned, however, with the delay 
caused by a bargaining requirement, and with the effect of that delay 
on the chances for rehabilitating the debtor.86 They can eliminate 
this concern by dispensing with the bargaining obligation in cases 
where the debtor in possession can demonstrate that the need for 
relief is so immediate that the delay caused by the negotiation re-
quirement will itself undermine the success of the reorganization. 
In most cases, the need for relief will not be so immediate, and 
84. In REA Express, the Second Circuit held that rejection of a labor contract should be 
permitted only when "a district court concludes that an onerous and burdensome executory 
collective bargaining agreement will thwart efforts to save a failing carrier in bankruptcy from 
collapse . . . . (T]he end result [of forbidding rejection] could well be to preclude financial 
reorganization of the carrier and thus lead to its demise." 523 F.2d at 169 (emphasis added). 
85. See Bankruptcy Code § 365(a), 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (Supp. III 1979). 
86. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 
H.R. Doc. No. 137, Pt. I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1973), Delay was a critical concern of the 
debtor in REA Express: "In sum, the collective bargaining agreements are claimed to be oner-
ous and burdensome because (1) their supplemental unemployment and consolidation provi-
sions would completely forestall the debtor, which is insolvent, from adopting and 
implementing a reorganization plan that would enable it to survive .... " 523 F.2d at 167. 
Such a case poses little alternative to unilateral action for a debtor faced with an uncooperative 
union. But not all debtors' needs are so pressing. Court proceedings themselves are slow and 
expensive. This Note counsels courts to implement a duty to bargain as a reflection of good 
business practice. The fact that the parties in Kevin Steel could not reach a compromise and 
spent over two years in the courts litigating the rejection issue may have been reflective of their 
history of poor labor-management relations. See Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 209 N.L.R.B. 493 
(1974). 
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the goals of the employees and the debtor in possession need not 
clash. Workers, of course, will lose their jobs if the company col-
lapses and both sides are likely to compromise to keep the business 
alive.87 The recent contract concessions made by the United Auto 
Workers during the Chrysler Corporation's financial crisis are a 
well-known example of labor-management cooperation in this 
area. 88 There is no reason to assume that other unions Will be less 
willing to protect the jobs of their members. 
Prerejection bargaining permits the parties to modify only the 
burdensome terms of a contract without affecting other, nonfinancial 
provisions of their agreement. Rejection, however, is an all-or-notµ-· 
87. For an example of debtor in possession-union cooperation, see Berman's, Inc. v. Allied 
Supermarkets, Inc. (In re Allied Supermarkets, Inc.), 6 Bankr. Rptr. 968, 970 (E.D. Mich. 
1980) (citation omitted): 
Prior to the submission of the Plan to the Bankruptcy Court, Allied [debtor] had also 
entered into discussions with the affected unions, and received tentative approval of the 
Business Plan J)articularly insofar as it pertained to the labor contracts in force. Discus-
sions were afao held with the employees and their union representatives for the purpose of 
explaining the scope and nature of concessions that were considered by Allied to be indis-
pensable to the continuation of the business. 
The amenability of a threatened bankruptcy proceeding to a labor-management compromise 
has already been recognized as presenting both parties with "a common misfortune and chal-
lenge [which] quickly overcome the resistaftce of each to union-management co-operation." C. 
GOLDEN & H. RUTIENBERG, THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 269 (1942). 
See also Rabin, Fibreboard and the Termination of Bargaining Unit Work: 17ze Search for 
Standards in JJejining the Scope of the JJuty to Bargain, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 803, 824 (1971). 
The article discusses an employer's duty to bargain with the union regarding a decision to 
subcontract work performed by union employees or a partial closing of the business. · 
In all these cases, the proffered cause of the employer's decision to close could have 
been rectified through union concessions on matters clearly within the union's control. 
Unions do on occasion offer to freeze wage demands, for example, by agreeing to extend 
the existing contract terms for an additional period, of to actually suffer a wage cut. At 
the very least, the union should be afforded the opportunity to amend its own position so 
as to persuade the employer to reverse its decision. 
Id. These principles apply equally to an employer's decision to seek rejection of a union con-
tract, since the cost of the contract, a matter "clearly within the union's control," is prompting 
the rejection. See also Note, 17ze Scope of Collective Bargaining, 14 YALE L.J. 1472, 1478 
(1965) ("[B]argaining should be required where it is possible that labor costs or related matters 
are involved. If the decision is in fact based upon external circumstances which could not be 
changed by union proposals, impasse will quickly be reached."). 
The Labor Board rejected a claim that a debtor in possession has a§ 8(a)(5) duty to discuss 
the decision to seek disaffi.rmance of the union contract in bankruptcy, but the Board was not 
presented with any arguments in support of such a duty. Airport Limousine Serv., Inc., 231 
N.L.R.B. 932, 935 (1977). 
The Supreme Court recently held that an employer has no Labor Act duty to bargain with 
the union representative over its decision to close part of its business. The Court remarked 
that it was "aware of past instances where unions have aided employers in savingfailing busi-
nesses by lending technical assistance, reducing wages and benefits or increasing production, 
and even loaning part of earned wages to forestall closures. These have come about without 
the intervention of the Board enforcing a statutory requirement to bargain." First Natl. Main-
tenance Corp. v. NLRB, 101 S. Ct. 2573, 2582 n.19 (1981) (emphasis added) (citations omit-
ted). Whether the debtor in possession's decision to reject a collective bargaining agreement is 
a mandatory subject of bargaining for Labor Act purposes is beyond the scope of this Note. 
The decision to close a plant, however, may be prompted by factors beyond a union's control, 
whereas a decision to seek rejection of a union contract is necessarily motivated by its expense, 
a matter clearly under the exclusive control of the union and employees. 
88. Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1979, at 3, col. l; [1979] LAB. REL. Y.B. 5 (BNA). 
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ing proposition. The debtor in possession cannot ask for partial re-
jection of a contract, nor can the court require that certain portions 
of an agreement be retained. 89 After rejection, the union and the 
employer renegotiate the entire collective bargaining agreement. 
This creates a risk that provisions that were not financially burden-
some will be altered, and that employees may not only receive 
smaller paychecks, but also may lose accrued seniority credit and 
vacation time. Bargaining prior to rejection protects employees 
against the loss of unburdensome benefits since the collective bar-
gaining agreement remains in existence and a debtor in possession 
asking for financial concessions will be unlikely to request ( or re-
ceive) other modifications as well. 
In addition to protecting workers' intangible benefits, bargaining 
also lessens the chances for labor unrest that rejection may provoke 
by allowing employees greater participation in the modification pro-
cess. The bargaining requirement encourages renegotiation of union 
contracts when the employer's financial condition drastically wors-
ens, and this peaceful discussion between the par.ties lessens the 
strike threat that unilateral termination may pose.90 
In these ways, the bargaining requirement protects, to the great-
est extent possible, the policies of both labor and bankruptcy law. 
By providing special protection to collective bargaining agreements, 
it safeguards employees' rights and the principle of labor-manage-
ment negotiation. At the same time, the requirement allows the 
debtor in possession to retain the flexibility needed to reorganize the 
business by permitting him to reject the labor contract, with court 
approval, if no compromise can be reached. 
CONCLUSION 
Collective bargaining agreements, like other executory contracts, 
may be rejected by a debtor in possession with the court's approval. 
The repercussions attending rejection of a labor contract, however, 
differ significantly from those associated with rejection of other 
agreements because of the debtor's ongoing need for a work force 
and the special protections and economic weapons granted to em-
ployees by the Labor Act. Bankruptcy courts should thus take 
greater cognizance of the special attributes of the employer-em-
ployee relationship by encouraging the parties to develop mutually 
agreeable contract modifications at the bargaining table, where pos-
sible, as an alternative to judicial interference through court-ap-
proved rejection. 
89. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY f 365.01(2], at 365-11 (15th ed. 1981); In re David A. 
Rosow, Inc., 9 Bankr. Rptr. 190, 193 n.5 (Bankr., D. Conn. 1981). The Bankruptcy Act also 
forbade partial rejection. In re Italian Cook Oil Corp., 190 F.2d 994, 997 (3d Cir. 1951); In re 
Klaber Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
90. See note 61 supra. 
